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KELLY V. ARRIBA SOFT CORP.:
COPYRIGHT LIMITATIONS ON
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION ON THE
INTERNET
Khoi D. Dangt
I. INTRODUCTION
The Copyright Act confers upon owners of copyrights the right
to prevent others from reproducing and publicly displaying their
copyrighted works.' Specifically, section 106 states that "the owner
of a copyright under this title has the exclusive rights.. . to
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies" and "to display the
copyrighted work publicly."2 However, with the growing number of
computer users accessing the Internet, and the advance of innovative
technologies organizing this access to information in meaningful
ways, copyright owners' exclusive rights to reproduce and display
their copyrighted works on the Internet, and the burgeoning
technologies to facilitate access to information, have increasingly
come into conflict.
3
t Khoi graduated from the University of California, Los Angeles, in 1996 with a B.A.
in English Literature as well as a B.A. in Political Science. Khoi then received his Masters in
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1. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
2. Id.
3. Web pages or Web sites are "linked" together through hypertext linking which
enables Internet users to jump from one Web page to another "linked" Web page. Mark
Sableman, Link Law Revisited: Internet Linking Law at Five Years, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1273, 1276 (2001). Currently, Web pages may be linked in at least one of three technical ways.
Id. at 1277. Typically, most hypertext links take the form of Hypertext Reference ("HREF")
links. Id. When users click on an HREF, the Web browser is instructed to go to the linked
location that is specified in the markup written in the HTML language. Id. HREFs may be
created by using words or images as the linking reference. Inline image linking also creates
links or associations among different Web pages or Web sites by pulling images located on one
site, and then displaying the image as part of second site. See Raymond Chan, Internet
Framing: Compliment or Hijack?, 5 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 143, 146
(1998/1999). Framing also links or associates different Web pages. Framing allows the owner
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In an effort both to preserve copyright owners' exclusive rights
and to accommodate advancing technologies designed to improve the
anarchic Internet, courts have looked to the principal exception to
these exclusive rights to determine whether these technologies can be
justified as "fair use." Section 107 of the Copyright Act specifically
provides that, notwithstanding the exclusive rights in section 106,
"the fair use of a copyrighted work.., is not an infringement. '4 The
statute itself delineates the principal factors for a court's consideration
in determining whether an infringing use can be justified as "fair
use." 5 Section 107 provides:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.6
In Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,7 plaintiff alleged that defendant's
new visual search engine, reproducing plaintiffs copyrighted
photographs to generate thumbnail image reference links and
displaying the full-sized images of plaintiff's copyrighted
photographs, infringed plaintiffs reproduction and public display
rights in those images.8 Plaintiff further alleged that defendant's
infringing uses could not be justified as "fair use." 9 In applying the
of one Web site to section and organize a Web page into several "frames" and then locate
different content in each individual frame. Id. In conjunction with inline linking, framing
enables a Web page owner to display content originating on a different Web site surrounded by
frames created by the owner of the second Web site. Id. Inline image linking and framing often
implicate copyright protection. See generally id. at 147. Pulling copyrighted images from one
Web site through inline image linking and then organizing the images in frames in a context
determined by the second Web site may trespass on the original copyright owner's exclusive
right to publicly display the image in the context and for purposes originally intended by the
copyright owner.
4. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
5. See id.
6. Id.
7. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002).
8. Id. at 938.
9. Appellant's Brief at 21, Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (No.
00-55521).
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multi-factor fair use test under section 107, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit attempted to strike a balance between protecting
copyright owners' exclusive rights and encouraging new technologies
designed to facilitate Internet navigation.
This Case Note examines the fair use multi-factor balancing test
as applied by the court in Kelly, with particular focus on
transformative use and the limits imposed on both innovative Internet
technologies and the assertion of exclusive copyrights on the Internet.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff-appellant, Leslie A. Kelly (hereinafter "Kelly"), is a
professional photographer specializing in photographs of the
American west and gold rush country. 10 Kelly displays some of his
photographs on two Web sites he owns, on which he markets
corporate retreats and sells books related to the subject of his
photographs." Kelly also licenses his photographs for display on
Web sites other than his own.12  Defendant-respondent, Ditto.com,
formerly known as Arriba Soft Corporation ("Arriba"), 13 maintains a
database of images, which have been indexed by its "Arriba Vista
Image Searcher" Internet search engine. 14 This search engine
responds to user queries by first scouring the Internet for related
images, retrieving and downloading the images onto Arriba's server,
converting the images into thumbnail form and then deleting the
downloaded image, and, finally, displaying the results of the search as
thumbnail images on the "results" page available for the user to
view. 5  From January 1999 to June 1999, users who clicked the
thumbnails would be linked to an "image attributes" window
containing full-sized images, which were inline linked from the
originating Web site and framed within borders containing text,
Arriba's banner, and advertisements selected by Arriba for display.'
6
From July 1999 until August 2000, Arriba altered its protocol and
included both a "Source" and "Details" link next to the thumbnail
image. 17 When users clicked the "Source" link, two windows would
10. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
11. Id.
12. See Kelly, 280 F.3d at 938.
13. Id. at 938 n.1 (Respondent-defendant changed its name to "Ditto.com" since the start
of the appeals litigation).
14. See Kelly, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 1117.
15. See Kelly, 280 F.3d at 938.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 939.
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appear; the forefront window contained the full-sized image inline-
linked and framed from the originating Web site, which appeared just
underneath. I8 At no point did Arriba's visual search engine copy the
full-sized image onto Arriba's server for the purposes of public
display, and the image remained on the originating Web site.19
Without Kelly's prior consent, Arriba's visual search engine
added thirty-five of Kelly's images to its image database. 20  Kelly
objected and filed suit against Arriba for copyright infringement, and
Arriba defended on the grounds of fair use.21 In balancing the fair use
factors, Judge Taylor of the district court granted summary judgment
in favor of Arriba on the grounds that Arriba's infringing use
constituted defensible fair use.22
With respect to the first factor, Judge Taylor found that Arriba's
use of Kelly's images both in thumbnail form and as full size images,
although commercial, was "significantly transformative.,
23
Therefore, this factor weighed in favor of fair use. 24 The second
factor was held against fair use on the grounds that Kelly's
photographs were artistic works and at the core of copyright
protection.25 Regarding the third factor, Judge Taylor held that use of
the entire images in thumbnail form was reasonable in relation to the
purpose and character of the visual search engine,26 but use of the
full-sized images was not necessary to the search engine's main
purpose.27 As a whole, however, Judge Taylor concluded that this
factor weighed only slightly against fair use.28 He found the fourth
factor weighed in favor of Arriba, because Kelly had not shown any
evidence of harm or adverse impact, and failed to refute Arriba's
proof tending to show a lack of market harm.29
With the score of two factors favoring fair use and two factors
against fair use, Judge Taylor returned to transformative use, because,
in his opinion, "the first factor of the fair use test is the most
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2002).
22. See id.
23. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
24. See id.
25. See id. at 1120.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
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important in this case." 30  Willing to accommodate technological
innovation, Judge Taylor remarked that, "when considering the
purpose and character of use in a new enterprise of this sort, it is more
appropriate to consider the transformative purpose, rather than early
imperfect means of achieving this purpose.' He also held that,
"[w]here as here, a new use and new technology are evolving, the
broad transformative purpose of the use [should] weigh more heavily
than the inevitable flaws in its early stages of development. 3 2 Judge
Taylor therefore concluded that Arriba's infringing conduct was
33defensible on the grounds of fair use.
Kelly appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENTS
On appeal, Kelly argued that Judge Taylor's fair use analysis
failed to account separately for Arriba's infringement of Kelly's
reproduction rights by copying the full-sized image to generate the
thumbnails, and infringement of Kelly's public display rights when
Arriba inline-linked and then framed the images onto the image
attributes page.34 Moreover, Kelly argued that generating and
displaying the thumbnails on the "results" page and then allowing
users to view a full-sized image through the process of inline-linking
and framing does not constitute transformative use.
First, both infringing acts, comprehensively, have the same
purpose as Kelly's use of the images; namely, to attract users to their
respective sites in order to sell products. Second, the district court's
distinction between Kelly's aesthetic use of the photographs and
Arriba's functional use of the same does not support a finding of
transformative use.35 Specifically, Kelly argued that functional use is
irrelevant in light of the fact that Arriba's thumbnails and inline-
linked and framed display of full-sized images fail to add any new
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. Appellant's Brief at 20, Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (No.
00-55521). Interestingly, after identifying Arriba's conduct as two distinct copyright
infringements, plaintiffs brief then discussed both thumbnail creation and full-sized image
display as components of a single comprehensive use. See generally id. at 30.
35. See id.
2002]
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aesthetics, expression, meaning or message to the original work, but
constitutes a simple repackaging of the copyrighted work 6
IV. HOLDING, RATIONALE AND DISCUSSION
The circuit court agreed with Kelly that the issue of copyright
infringement should account separately for Arriba's infringement of
Kelly's reproduction rights through generation of the thumbnails and
Arriba's infringement of Kelly's public display rights by inline-
linking and framing of Kelly's images.37 Accordingly, the court
considered the fair use factors of each potentially infringing use
separately, although primarily focusing on the first factor.
A. Thumbnails
1. The purpose and character of the use
Like Judge Taylor, the court began its analysis of this prong by
citing to Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.38  In Campbell, the
Supreme Court rejected the contention that an alleged infringer's
mere commercial use was conclusively dispositive of the same
purpose and/or same character of use. 39 Rather, the Campbell Court
noted that the primary purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether
the "new work merely supersede[s] the object of the original creation,
or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or
message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new
work is transformative." 40 Accordingly, commercial use is but one
factor in the analysis that weighs against fair use.
With regards to commercial use of the thumbnails, the court
concluded that Arriba's commercial use of Kelly's images was not
"highly exploitative" and "only slightly [weighed] against a finding of
fair use.' 41 The court agreed with Judge Taylor that Arriba's use of
Kelly images was unlike traditional commercial uses of copyrighted
works. 42 Arriba's use was found to be more "incidental" to the
purpose of the visual search engine because Kelly's images were only
36. See id. at 33.
37. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2002).
38. See id. at 940.
39. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
40. See id. at 579.
41. Kelly, 280 F.3d at 940.
42. Id. at 941.
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a few among a thousand that were converted into thumbnails. In
addition, Kelly's images displayed in thumbnail form were not used
to directly promote Arriba's Web site.43 Instead, the commercial
value of the visual search engine lies in its ability to search the
Internet for images and index the images in thumbnail form for
display to users, and not to directly market and sell the images to
users.
44
The heart of the court's finding in favor of fair use on this issue
was the transformative use factor. The court rejected Kelly's
contention that Kelly's own purpose and use of his images, and the
purpose and use for which Arriba employed them, were identical-to
attract visitors and then market products and services to them through
advertisements located on their respective Web sites. Rather, the
court found that Kelly's images were "artistic works used for
illustrative purposes" to "portray scenes from the American West in
an esthetic manner. '45  On the other hand, the court agreed with
Arriba that the purpose of reproducing Kelly's images to generate the
thumbnails for display was to improve access to images on the
46Internet. 6 Although the court noted that this function provided a
public benefit, it did not explicitly decide whether providing a public
benefit alone would weigh in favor of a finding of transformative
use.
47
In finding Arriba's use of Kelly's works to be functional in
character and purpose, the court explicitly rejected Kelly's argument
that functional use is irrelevant for transformative use
determinations.48 In support of the relevancy of functional use, the
court cited to Nunez v. Caribbean International News Corp.49  In
Nunez, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that placing a
photograph that was originally intended to be part of a modeling
portfolio in a news article transformed the use of the original work
into news and created a new meaning and purpose for the work.5° In
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. See generally Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 942 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding
that the use of Kelly's photographs to generate thumbnails was not antithetical to the Copyright
Act because such use does not stifle creativity, but enables the additional public benefit of
improving information gathering techniques on the Internet).
48. See id.
49. Nunez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000).
50. Kelly, 280 F.3d at 942 (citing Nunez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18 (1st
Cir. 2000)).
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the court's opinion, the thumbnails predicament was analogous to that
presented in Nunez; the use of the copyrighted work for a different
function and for a different purpose than originally intended by the
copyright owner may be sufficient to transform the work and give the
original a new meaning and expression.5 1  Accordingly, giving
copyrighted works a different function than originally intended may
support a finding of transformative use.
The court next addressed the problem that the thumbnails
themselves might be used for artistic purposes as well, because they
were reproductions of Kelly's full-sized images in miniature.52 It is
precisely at this point that the court's analysis moved from legal
analysis based on precedent to weighing of probabilities based on
realities. The court opined that "users are unlikely to enlarge the
thumbnails and use them for artistic purposes because the thumbnails
are of much lower resolution than the originals; any enlargement
results in a significant loss of clarity of the image, making them
inappropriate for display material. 5 3 Accordingly, "it is unlikely that
anyone would use Arriba's thumbnails for illustrative or esthetic
purposes, because enlarging them sacrifices their clarity.
54
Therefore, the court concluded that Arriba's infringing reproduction
of Kelly's images to generate thumbnails was sufficiently
transformative, and, as such, entitled to fair use protection under the
first factor.55
2. Nature of the copyrighted work
With regards to this factor, the court agreed with Judge Taylor's
finding that Kelly's photographic works are creative in nature, and
therefore "are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than
are more fact-based works. 56  However, since Kelly had already
published these photographs on the Internet, the photographs were
"more likely to qualify as fair use because the first appearance of the
artist's expression has already occurred., 57 Therefore, the court held
51. See id. at 942.
52. See generally id. at 941.
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 942.
56. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 943 (9th Cir. 2002).
57. Id. (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985)
(noting that the scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished works because the
author's right to control the first public appearance of his work weighs against the use of his
work before its release)).
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that this second fair use factor only "slightly weighs" in favor of
Kelly.5"
3. The amount and substantiality of the portion used
In analyzing the third factor, the court found that it was
reasonable for Arriba to use the entire photograph to generate the
thumbnail so that "users could recognize the image and decide
whether to pursue more information about the image or the
originating Web site," 59 and that a "partial reproduction would reduce
the usefulness of the search engine., 60 However, because Arriba used
the entire photograph to generate a thumbnail, and that "copying an
entire work militates against a finding for fair use,",61 the court
concluded that this factor was therefore neutral.62
4. Potential market harms
Regarding this fourth factor, the court stated that the "fourth
factor often depends upon how transformative the new use is
compared to the original use," 63 and that "a transformative work is
less likely to have an adverse impact on the market of the original
than a work that merely supersedes the copyrighted work.",64 Since
the court earlier found the purpose and use of thumbnail images as
reference links to be functional and sufficiently transformative, it
found that Arriba's use of Kelly's photographs for such purpose did
not harm the market for Kelly's images.65 Rather, the court opined
that the visual search engine would help guide Internet users to
Kelly's Web sites, since users were unlikely to enlarge the thumbnails
to create a viable substitute for the full-sized image on Kelly's Web
66
site.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (quoting Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, 227 F.3d
1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000)).
62. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 943 (9th Cir. 2002).
63. Id. at 948.
64. Id. at 943 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994)
(stating that a "work that supersedes the object of the original serves as a market replacement for
it, making it likely that market harm will occur, but when the second use is transformative,
market substitution is less certain.")).
65. See id. at 944.
66. See id.
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5. Conclusion
Based on the four factors of the fair use analysis, the court
concluded that both the first and fourth factors weighed in favor of
fair use, the second factor only slightly weighed against fair use, and
the third factor was neutral.67 Therefore, generating thumbnail
images by reproducing the copyrighted full-sized image and
subsequently using the thumbnail images as reference links in a visual
search engine is not copyright infringement.
B. Full-Sized Images
Although Arriba did not explicitly defend on the grounds of fair
use with regards to inline linking, and then framing, a full-sized
image on Arriba's Web site, both the district court and the appellate
court addressed fair use with regards to this conduct.6 8 The district
court began its analysis of this issue by explicitly stating that the
process of inline image linking from the originating Web site and then
framing these images on the target Web site does not involve
copying.69 Rather, by inline linking and framing Kelly's photographs,
which resided on Kelly's own Web pages or Web pages to which
Kelly licenses his photographs, Arriba publicly displayed the
copyrighted images in violation of Kelly's exclusive rights to display
those same photographs.7 °
The court first noted that "[n]o cases have addressed the issue of
whether inline linking or framing violates a copyright owner's public
display rights.' However, the court opined that the present
problems presented by inline image linking and framing are
analogous to those in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc.
72
In Webbworld, a federal district court in Texas found that Webbworld
violated Playboy's exclusive right to display its copyrighted images
by downloading material from certain newsgroups, discarding the
associated text, retaining only the images, and then making the
images available to subscribers of Webbworld's services.73
67. See id.
68. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 947 (9th Cir. 2002).
69. See id. at 944.
70. See id. at 947.
71. Id. at 945.
72. See id. (citing Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D.
Texas 1997)).
73. See id. (citing Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. at 549-50).
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The court further likened the extent of Arriba's conduct to the
defendant in another case involving Playboy.74  In Playboy
Enterprises, Inc., v. Hardenburgh, Inc.,75 the court held that a
defendant-owner of a computer bulletin board service (BBS) is both
directly and contributorily liable for copyright infringement by
encouraging BBS users to upload Playboy's copyrighted images to
the BBS central file, screening all uploads, and then moving some
images into files in order to make such materials available for
download by other BBS users.76 The Hardenburgh court held that
defendant's action amounted to an infringing display when the
defendant made copyrighted materials available for subscribers to
download.7
The court in Kelly noted that unlike the Webbworld and
Hardenburgh defendants, Arriba did not actually copy the
copyrighted images onto its server for purposes of generating the full-
sized images.7 8 However, the court found that Arriba's actions were
analogous in that Arriba "took an active role in creating the display of
the copyrighted images."79 The court held that by inline linking and
framing copyrighted images on the "image attributes" or "Source"
page, Arriba's visual search engine went beyond being a mere
passive conduit. 80 The court found Arriba played an active role in the
public display by searching the Web for Kelly's images and then
inline-linking and framing Kelly's copyrighted images onto the
"images attributes" or "Source" page, thereby providing Internet users
a "direct link" to the copyrighted images, without permission from
copyright owners. 81 The court reasoned that "[w]ithout this program,
users would not have been able to view Kelly's images within the
context of Arriba's site" 82 and that merely providing this capability is
sufficient to establish the infringement.83
74. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 946 (9th Cir. 2002).
75. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
76. Kelly, 280 F.3d at 946 (citing Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503).
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 947.
81. Id.
82. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 947 (9th Cir. 2002).
83. See id. at 946.
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1. Character and purpose of the use
After finding prima facie copyright infringement of Kelly's
public display rights, the court then addressed Arriba's fair use
defense with regards to the full-sized images. The court differentiated
Arriba's use of Kelly's images as thumbnails and as full-sized images
on the ground that the latter does not enhance the use of the visual
search engine.8 4 The court noted that the full-sized images did not
function as a "means to access other information," but were "likely
the end product themselves. ' 5 The court opined that the primary
purpose of this "end product" would be artistic expression, therefore
86having the same purpose as Kelly's purpose in those images.
Furthermore, the court agreed with Kelly that Arriba's use of
full-sized images for display did not add new expression to the
images, thereby transforming the use of copyrighted images.87 The
court found that merely "placing the images in a 'frame' or locating
them near text that specifies the size and originating web site is not
enough to create new expression or meaning for the images. 88
Therefore, because Arriba's use of Kelly's images was not
transformative, and given the commercial nature of Arriba's use, the
court found that this first factor weighed against a finding of fair use.
2. Nature of the copyrighted work
The analysis of the second factor is essentially the same as that
for the thumbnails, "because Kelly's images are still the copyrighted
images at issue." 89  Therefore, this second factor only "slightly
weighs" against fair use.
90
3. The amount and substantiality of the portion used
The court held that Arriba's use of the entire photographs to
create a full-sized public display was not reasonable, because "giving
users access to the full-sized images without having to go to another
site" is not a legitimate purpose. 9'
84. See id. at 947.
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 947 (9th Cir. 2002).
89. Id. at 948.
90. Id.
91. See id.
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4. Potential market harms
With regards to the fourth factor, the court reiterated that
determination of potential market harms related back to the initial
transformative use inquiry. 92  The court reasoned that "a
transformative work is less likely to have an adverse impact on the
market of the original than a work that merely supersedes the
copyrighted work., 93 Because Arriba's use was not transformative,
the fourth factor also weighed against fair use. The court determined
that, "by giving users access to Kelly's full-sized images on its own
web site, Arriba harms all of Kelly's markets. 94  Specifically, the
court found that inline linking and framing harm the potential market
for Kelly's images in two ways. First, it deters users from actually
visiting Kelly's web site since users would not have to actually access
Kelly's website to view those images.95 Secondly, it enables users to
infringe Kelly's copyright by allowing users to download the full-
sized image from the Arriba's inline linked and framed display of
Kelly's photographs and then sell or license the images themselves.9 6
5. Conclusion
Applying the fair use factors to such use, the court concluded
that because the full-sized images displayed through the process of
inline linking and framing did not amount to transformative use of the
images, the purpose and character of Arriba's use of the copyrighted
images were the same as Kelly's purpose and use.97 Further,
permitting Arriba to use the copyrighted images in this manner would
potentially harm the market for Kelly's images displayed on his own
Web sites. 98 Therefore, the court concluded that all four factors
weighed against fair use, and that Arriba did not fairly use Kelly's
copyrighted images in publicly displaying those images through inline
linking and framing. 99
92. See generally id. at 943.
93. Id. at 943 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994)
(stating that a "work that supersedes the object of the original serves as a market replacement for
it, making it likely that market harm will occur, but when the second use is transformative,
market substitution is less certain.")).
94. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 948 (9th Cir. 2002).
95. Id.
96. See id
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Although I believe the court reached the correct conclusion
regarding both defendant's infringing reproduction and public display
of plaintiff's copyrighted works, the court's application of the fair use
factors leaves open many questions. One question is whether there
are really any other factors beyond transformative use. Under the
court's approach, a transformative use will justify wholesale copying
of those works at the core of copyright protection and the creation of
a market different than the original use of the copyrighted work. It
appears from the court's analysis that even an inquiry into
transformative use involves a balancing of realities and probabilities:
whether users are likely to enlarge the thumbnails for their own
infringing purposes, or whether the public display of the full-sized
images would likely be viewed from the user's perspective as end
products themselves, thereby superseding Kelly's intended use.
Further, in analyzing transformative use with regards to the
thumbnails, the court specifically held that Kelly's use and purpose in
his images were primarily aesthetic, but then acknowledged in its
analysis of Arriba's infringing public display, that there are many
markets for which Kelly may appropriately use his images. This begs
the question: are the principal markets in which copyrighted materials
may be "used" fixed by the primary use for which the copyright
owner originally intended his work? I believe the court's analysis
sidesteps these issues through its analysis of the public benefit.
Whether new Internet technologies, designed to organize Internet
navigation, and provide easier and more convenient access to
copyrighted materials posted on the Internet, will constitute
infringement of these same copyrights therefore may depend on
whether these technologies provide a public benefit independent of
the benefits the public already receives from the copyrighted
materials themselves. According to the court, thumbnail images
containing a reference link provide this independent benefit, full-sized
images that have been inline image linked and framed in a secondary
Web site do not.
Although whether or not this decision provides an effective
balance of the competing interests between copyright owners and the
public on the Internet remains debatable, it provides sufficient notice
that at least courts in the Ninth Circuit will be looking at the
innovative technological services separately within the whole service
offering to determine the appropriate copyright limitations on each.
Innovation itself does not provide sufficient justification for copyright
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infringement on the Internet, but innovation coupled with an
independent public benefit may just tip the analysis in favor of fair
use.

